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Abstract –The complexity of modern products, systems and processes makes the task 
to identify, characterise and provide sufficient assurance about the desirable properties 
a major challenge. Stakeholders also, demand a degree of enhanced confidence about 
the absence of undesirable properties with a potential to cause harm or loss. The paper 
develops a framework of seven fundamental facets of performance as an ontology for 
emergent behavioural properties and a separate framework for the emergent structural 
properties of complex systems. The emergent behavioural aspects are explored and 
we develop a systems framework for assurance based on an Assessment and 
Management paradigm each comprising a number of principles and processes. The 
key argument advanced is that in the face of complexity and incessant change, 
enhanced confidence in the achievement of desirable and avoidance of undesirable 
properties requires a systems approach empowered by suitable modelling and relevant 
diagnostic tools explaining the nature of emergent properties. The principal focus of 
this paper is on safety, security and sustainability emergent behavioural (performance) 
aspects of complex products, systems and processes.  
Keywords: Safety, Security, Complexity Sustainability, Assurance, Systems 
Approach  
1 Introduction 
Amongst many challenges arising from the pervasive complexity in most modern 
products, systems and processes is the necessity to identify, characterise and provide 
sufficient assurance about the desirable properties. Alongside this, most key stakeholders, 
specifically the regulators and end users, demand a similar degree of enhanced confidence 
about the absence of undesirable properties often with a potential to cause harm or loss, for 
such products, systems or processes. We develop and propose a framework of seven 
fundamental facets of performance as an ontology for emergent behavioural properties and 
a separate framework for the emergent structural properties in complex and/or large scale 
system of systems. Understanding and managing complexity, as well as characterising 
structure are central to this work. 
The need for conceptualisation, analysis, assessment and enhanced confidence in the 
properties of complex systems, specifically the emergent behavioural aspects is 
subsequently explored where we develop and propose a systems framework for assurance 
based on an Assessment and Management paradigm each comprising a number of 
principles and processes. The key argument advanced is that in the face of complexity and 
incessant change, enhanced confidence in the achievement of desirable and avoidance of 
undesirable properties itself requires a systems approach, supported by appropriate 
modelling tools and diagnostics. These are needed to understand the nature of emergent 
properties as features of aggregation in complex processes and thus help us to avoid making 
erroneous decisions with costly and sometimes irreversible consequences. The principal 
focus of this paper is on safety, security and sustainability emergent behavioural 
(performance) aspects of complex products, systems and processes, but the framework has 
more general validity.  
2 Complexity and Emergent Properties  
Complex Systems is the term that emerges in many disciplines and domains and has many 
interpretations, implications and associated problems. The features of a specific domain 
characterise the dominant forms of complexity associated with the problem. A very 
significant class of complexity issues is linked to the multidimensionality of views of a 
system and in particular the design and operation in the case of industrial systems. Figure 
(1) describes the basic system shell and this indicates the multi-view of the system that is 
linked to: 
(i) Physical Process Dimension 
(ii) Signals, Operations Dimension 
(iii) Data, IT, Software Dimension 
(iv) Embedding in the Environment  
 
The distinguishing features of this viewing of the system are the close links between 
modelling, system structure, system organisation, measurement, structures information, 
control, decision, management and resulting system properties and such a study requires a 
systems framework.  
In this paper our interest is focused on aspects of systems performance. The performance 
of complex systems is a measure of their utility, output and perceived emergent properties 
and central issues to this study are: (i) Characterisation and Management of System 
Complexity; (ii) Emergent structural and non-structural properties; (iii) Emergent 
behavioural properties. Problem complexity is manifested in many different ways which 
include: 
(a) Lack of knowledge, or difficulties in characterising the behaviour of the basic process 
(Unit Behavioural Complexity). 
(b) Complexity of computational engines (Computational Complexity). 
(c)  Difficulties in characterising the interconnection topology of sub-processes and/or 
variability, uncertainty of this topology during the system lifecycle (Interconnection 
Topology Complexity). 
(d)  Large scale dimensionality (Large Scale Complexity) 
(e) Heterogeneous nature of sub-processes, resulting in hybrid forms of behaviour 
(Hybrid Behavioural Complexity). 
(f) Organisational alternatives for the functioning, information and decision making 
(control) structures in respond to goals and operational requirements (Organisational 
Complexity). 
(g) Variability and/or uncertainty on the system’s environment during the lifecycle 
requiring flexibility in organisation (Lifecycle Complexity). 
(h) Uncertainty in describing the embedding of the system in its environment 
(Environment Embedding Complexity) 
 
Emergent properties refer to aggregate aspects of behaviour of the system properties 
which are frequently linked to specific metrics defined by the system variables. The 
emergent behavioural properties of complex systems comprise an ontology of seven often 
context sensitive facets namely: (1) Technical functionality; (2) Cost; (3) Environmental 
behaviours & Sustainability; (4) Reliability, Availability, Maintainability; (5) Safety & 
Security; (6) Quality; (7) Perceived Value. Such properties are reasonably distinct and often 
inter-related, thus posing a major challenge to designers, to arrive at optimum solutions 
which satisfy stakeholders’ expectations on each dimension. The evaluation of their degree 
of presence, or absence and the nature of interrelationships between them is a challenge that 
frequently depends on the nature of the specific system.  A key distinction between these 
emergent properties is the fact that apart from safety, security and environmental 
performance, which are subject to a regulatory framework, the desirable level for the rest of 
these properties e.g. cost, reliability, quality etc. are left to the discretion of the duty holders 
and market forces. This therefore creates a legal compliance issue for attaining and assuring 
certain characteristics as well as deliver the corporate social responsibility. 
The key differentiation between safety and security performance is: safety is freedom 
from harm to people caused by unintentional or random/systematic errors and failures of a 
product, process, system or mission whilst security is freedom from loss caused by 
deliberate acts perpetrated by people. Therefore security is principally characterised by 
intent and nature of causation as opposed to strictly being an output performance indicator 
reflecting degrees of loss or gain. Like safety performance, security of a system is mainly 
measured probabilistically in terms of risk due to inherent uncertainties.  
The security of systems is often forecast and measured in terms of perceived or real 
threats and vulnerabilities and not in terms of consequential risk of harm and loss. The 
threat is often an external source of malicious intent whereas vulnerability is an inherent 
flaw/dysfunction in a system making it prone to external and sometimes internal threats. 
There’s a lack of systemic approach in identification, assessment and management of such 
risks in most enterprises and endeavors. This paper develops a systemic framework for 
assurance of safety and security in complex systems whilst proposing an innovative set of 
performance criteria for these critical facets of emergence/performance. We further 
endeavour to develop the case for a unified approach to emergence, assessment and 
management of emergent properties in complex products, processes, systems and 
undertakings. To this end, we propose sustainability provides a candidate unifying 
framework in the sense that, from a holistic perspective, any product, process, system or 
undertaking which lacks the right blend of desirable emergent properties such as safety, 
quality, reliability, affordability, environmental friendliness, social acceptance etc. can be 
viewed as unsustainable. 
3 Systems Safety & Security, the Fundamentals 
3.1 System Safety Concepts 
The classical view of safety performance in hard and soft systems [5] is often biased 
towards historical accidents and often feeble post mortem attempts at understanding the 
causation and prevention . This deficient and primordial paradigm is challenged on the 
grounds that: 
 
• Same accident may arise from a multiplicity of different causative factors; 
• Accident investigations are predominately driven by legal imperatives and the need for 
finding a responsible person/body as opposed to the systemic understanding of the 
underlying root causes; 
• Increasing pace of change, innovation and complexity in modern systems creates 
opportunities for new forms of accidents as yet un-encountered; 
• The social, legal and organizational costs linked with accidents are increasing due to 
public awareness, regulation and the litigation process. 
 
It is argued therefore that allowing accidents to happen and the subsequent often 
inconclusive and feeble attempts at investigation and learning is tantamount to negligence 
and admission of failure in the face of challenges and risks faced. A new advanced 
paradigm based on credible and objective scientific principles is needed to counter the 
formidable risks posed by modern complex undertakings.  
 (1) The Systems Approach to Safety  
In view of the major shortcomings of the classical accident focused approach cited above, 
the systems approach to specification, realisation and management of safe and secure 
systems is founded on the identification of hazardous states, generally precursors to 
accidents. This generates a deeper insight in complex behaviours and can expose a vast 
array of faults, errors, failures and vulnerabilities which may lead to the realisation of 
hazardous states. Likewise, a hazard focused approach provides the opportunity to 
objectively scrutinise the potential escalation scenarios associated with a hazard and devise 
solutions to detect, contain, control or mitigate the broad range of accidents which may 
arise from such states in a system.  
In sharp contrast to the reactive learning from accidents, the systems approach to safety 
assurance focuses on empirical as well as creative identification of hazards. Once a suite of 
key hazardous states are identified and ranked, it explores their causes, random or 
systematic [7], scrutinises their escalation scenarios and devises risk control and mitigation 
strategies [1]. Crucial for this is the need for a general systems framework that defines the 
relevant states. 
(2) The Need  for System Safety Metrics 
Safety is a human focused concept reflecting the degree of freedom from unacceptable 
harm to people. Paradoxically, it is often measured by its absence for example, the safety of 
products, processes, and systems is regularly quoted in terms of risk of harm they may 
cause to specific groups as opposed to the expected duration of harm free operation akin to 
reliability! The other fallacy is to forecast the safety of a complex system principally based 
on the empirical or past performance of similar systems, a notion which relates to random 
rather than systematic causes of hazards  naively assuming that the future is a simple 
(linear) evolution of the past. The irony being that most modern and complex systems 
principally suffer from the systematic errors due to pervasive incorporation of embedded 
intelligence. 
Safety is predominately measured in terms of risk which is a forecast comprising the 
likelihood/frequency of an accident and the degree of loss that it may entail. This poses a 
challenge to duty holders or system designers who find it difficult to relate the faults and 
failures of their products or systems to likely injuries and fatalities to the end users. To this 
end, some system standards [7] have advocated hazard rates as a direct measure of system 
safety, leading to the classification of system’s safety properties in terms of Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL). The SIL concept which has a widespread following in industry is more akin to 
a reliability perspective and is a non-systemic convention without much regard to the 
consequences of the dangerous failures [9]. It simply considers a range of potential 
functional failures in probability or frequency that are undesirable and considered to be 
dangerous, lacking a systemic appreciation of the real world implications of such failures. 
They are just called dangerous without a unit declared for danger! This is a far cry from 
science in safety even though exceedingly small numbers such as 1E-09 are employed as 
acceptable dangerous hourly functional failure rates for high dependability systems. 
Some sector standards, strangely derivatives of the IEC system standard [7], such as 
those for safety critical transport [8] advocate Tolerable Hazard Rates (THR), taking into 
account a total systemic perspective and the notion of tolerability of risk. We need systemic 
metrics which go beyond failure and take into account exposure of various groups at risk 
and the potential escalation scenarios and tolerability criteria [17]. The THR concept, 
principally reliant on historical performance of systems, goes a fair way towards this ideal 
but fails to explicitly address all requisite factors in a single metric. There’s a need for a 
portfolio of systemic lead as well as lag indicators for safety, security and sustainability of 
complex systems.  
3.2 System Security Concepts 
Unlike safety, security has many different interpretations and implications for its 
stakeholders. From a systems perspective, security is lack of susceptibility to malicious 
intent which may comprise; (i) Vandalism; (ii) Sabotage; (iii) Theft and fraudulent gain; 
(iv) Terrorism; or a combination thereof. Security or lack of it is principally characterized 
by the intent on causing harm and therefore, it is a mostly human focused issue. However, 
in the cybernetics domain, this may become a concern between autonomous intelligent 
systems without direct human intervention [6]. 
(1) The Systems Approach to Security 
There are two fundamental facets to security of a general system. The extrinsic dimension 
or driver is threat, characterized by the real or perceived existence of people or systems 
with intention to cause harm and loss. The intrinsic dimension or counterpart is 
vulnerability. Whilst threats are diverse and unlikely to be fully forecast, anticipated or 
controlled, vulnerabilities are characteristics of a general system, which arise from lack of 
awareness to potential for harm from threats in the larger environment of operation. 
Frequently, vulnerability may be characterized as a structural system property linked to 
interconnection topology, or some system functionality with a critical role, or linked to 
external to the system factors (external influences). Defining system vulnerability in 
concrete terms requires diagnostics and an appropriate methodology. 
The main thrust of systems security assurance rests upon systematic identification of 
key vulnerabilities, analysis of the causations and potential escalation scenarios and 
evaluation of pertinent risks. This is followed by proactive development of elimination or 
control strategies for major vulnerabilities and identification of detection, containment or 
mitigation solutions in the event of realisation of threats. However, similarly to the systems 
safety related precursors (hazards), vulnerabilities, seen as aspects of a system’s 
architecture or operation are mostly a concern at the system boundary. An elaboration of 
this may lead to the consideration of internal and external threats and vulnerabilities with 
major implications for systems security (beyond the scope of the current debate). In 
Systems of systems (SoS), or large open systems with significant vulnerabilities, security is 
often assured through focus on threats rather than vulnerabilities.  
(2)The Need for System Security Metrics  
Bearing in mind the extrinsic and intrinsic facets, it is instructive to identify, quantify and 
treat threats and vulnerabilities collectively to ensure completeness and coverage of key 
concerns. Threat as an extrinsic measure for a system’s security is generally classed into a 
number of distinct levels. The US Department of Homeland Security defines five Threat 
Conditions, each identified by a description and corresponding colour. From lowest to 
highest, the levels and colours are: (a) Low = Green; (b) Guarded = Blue; (c) Elevated = 
Yellow; (d) High = Orange; (e) Severe = Red. However, these are principally threat criteria 
relating to terrorism, whereas risk includes both the probability of an attack occurring and 
its potential losses. 
In a similar manner to the threats, metrics are called for systems vulnerabilities since 
these render a system susceptible to damage and harm, even in the absence of malicious 
intent at the outset. Even though the safety concept of SIL is not truly indicative of safety 
properties of a complex system [9], it is more appropriate for measurement of vulnerability 
since this is an intrinsic (architectural, compositional and operational) system property. A 
credible metric for system’s vulnerability would provide an objective measure of its 
resilience against potential threats. This could be a System Resilience Index which needs to 
be elaborated and quantified for various classes of vulnerability. 
3.3 System Sustainability Concepts 
(1) The Systems Approach to Sustainability 
Sustainability is a high level emergent system property that expresses the ability of the 
system to survive and continue to function according to the original goals set for its 
operation. It is thus related to :  
(i) Robustness of the system behaviour to external disturbances ;  
(ii) Ability to overcome threats that may have catastrophic consequences by demonstrating 
capabilities to survive and achieve the central goal ;  
(iii) Adaptability by demonstrating capability to reorgonise its control and information 
structures after some catastrophic events, or changes in the operational goals of the system 
due to changes in the market ; 
(iv) Potential for the system to evolve in a  continuously changing environment of goals, 
specifications and constraints. 
In principle, apart from survivability and résilience attributes, sustainability possesses 
social, economic and enviornmental dimensions as well, making it a complex composite 
property in its own right. It is clear therefore that the basic concepts required to define 
sustainability are themselves emergent system properties and it is this that makes 
sustainability a higher level emergent property. 
(2) The Need for System Sustainability Metrics 
Defining sustainability as an emergent higher level, composite property implies the need to:  
 
(i) Identify the constituent primitive emergent properties. (ii) Develop diagnostics for 
characterising and evaluating these properties. (iii) Develop a coneptual system framework 
expressing sustainability as composition, aggregation of the constituent emergent 
properties. (iv) Develop a meta-model expressing this aggregation and enabling the 
evaluation-estimation of sustainability. 
Developing sustainability metrics is very challenging and requires addressing all 
previous issues .The difficulties are due to the characterisation of primitive emergent 
properties in a quantifiable way, and expressing their composition in a form that supports 
development of composite metrics.  
4 Systems Safety, Security and Sustainability Assurance : the 
Framework 
We propose two complementary and advanced sets of systems principles and processes as 
the underpinning backbone to tackling the challenges of safety, security and potentially 
sustainability. Taking a life-cycle perspective [12] these comprise I & III below; 
■ Assessment: This comprises recognising the need, defining the system, specifying and 
identifying/understanding of key    properties, behaviours, hazards and vulnerabilities, 
evaluating and assessing expected impact;  
■ Realisation: This is ultimately aimed realising the desirable properties and achieving the 
desired performance in the form of product, process, system, mission or undertaking; 
■ Management: this comprises taking the outcome of assessment and realisation into 
consideration and ensuring deployment, delivery of requisite performance, continued 
monitoring and control through a responsive and holistic suite of strategies and actions. 
Whilst Realisation is specific to a given domain and context, the Assessment and 
Management aspects as a suite of principles constitute a meta-knowledge framework which 
can be abstracted and developed for almost universal application across many domains and 
disciplines. The systemic framework of assessment and management is equally applicable 
and effective within the context of desirable as well as undesirable properties of systems. 
This is contrary to the current conventional wisdom where specification, delivery and 
continual monitoring of desirable aspects of performance is regarded as an essentially 
domain expertise where as the undesirable and unintended emergent properties (hazards 
and vulnerabilities) are the forte of so called risk management. The +Safe3 extension [11] 
to the renowned CMMi model [14] also distinguishes between Safety Engineering & Safety 
Management, which are mainly synonymous with Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
advocated here.  
Whilst presented as a dual and complementary suite of principles and processes, 
assessment and management are iterative and systemic in the sense that processes inherent 
in the management framework employ assessment activities at requisite points to support 
judicious decision making and ensuring optimal performance. These are collectively 
referred to as Systems Assurance and labelled as Surety Framework in this paper. 
3.4 Risk Assessment 
This key facet of Surety framework depicted in Fig. 2 is proposed as a backbone to the 
identification, specification, evaluation and assessment of the undesirable events or 
properties adversely affecting technical functionality, cost, reliability, safety, quality etc. 
The risk assessment process [13] comprises seven systemic aspects such as: (a) Hazard 
Identification; (b) Causal Analysis; (c) Consequence Analysis; (d) Loss Analysis; (e) 
Options Analysis; (f) Impact Analysis; (g) Demonstration of Compliance. 
The risk assessment process, aims to enhance the systemic understanding of the key 
issues and it is not an end in itself. Assessment process generates transparency and 
awareness of real and potential issues thus empowering the duty holders to take appropriate 
actions and make the transition from fire fighting and reactivity to anticipation and 
proactivity. 
3.5 Risk Management 
A holistic and systemic approach to assurance of safety and security is developed and 
proposed in a major paper [4]. The paper elaborates seven principles which have to be 
collectively fulfilled before sufficient assurance is gained and maintained in the desirable 
safety and security properties of a general system. This complementary aspect of assurance 
within the Surety Framework comprises an advanced and systematic approach to 
developing, sustaining, enhancing and managing the so called downside events and 
properties associated with any system. Risk management builds upon the outcome of 
systematic assessment and ensures the identified and prioritized risks are eliminated, 
mitigated or continually controlled in a comprehensive and responsive manner. The risk 
management process is depicted in Fig. 3. 
The proposed systems set of principles demands a detailed scrutiny of the problem 
domain, as the key stage in safety/security assurance followed by a number of 
complementary and value added activities. The principles underpinning the systemic 
management of safety and security are; 
(1) Proactivity; (2) Prevention; (3) Protection & Containment; (4) Preparedness & 
Response; (5) Recovery & Restoration; (6) Organization & Learning; (7) Continual 
Enhancement. 
These principles are detailed in [4]. However, the suite of seven principles is equally 
applicable to systems in which, in view of the complexity or novelty, assurance is mainly 
derived from the quality of the process and competencies of those involved. 
3.6 Application of the Framework 
The systemic framework of assessment and management proposed here is applicable to the 
attainment, maintenance and enhancement of three key and increasingly regulated aspects 
of safety, security and the environmental performance/sustainability of systems.  
Nano-technology poses a modern and innovative domain where the safety and indeed 
security and the environmental implications of its products and offerings are largely 
unknown. An illustrative case involves the marketing of cosmetics containing nano-
particles [10]. Because of their far smaller size, these particles are absorbed deeper into 
epidermis, dermis, cells and eventually into the blood stream of the users. The significant 
uncertainty on the risks has led to calls from the UK Royal Society and the US Federal 
Drug Administration (FDA) for research into the likely effects. The cosmetics industry 
considers nano-particles a “hot technology” with lots of intriguing applications, allocating 
vast sums to research into nano-technology. The FDA maintains that urgent research is 
called for due to the paucity of the knowledge on the effects of the nano-particles when 
they enter cells in the human body. A systemic framework constitutes a potent weapon in 
the face of such huge uncertainties with major implications for the human society at large. 
The seven underpinning principles for risk management can be mapped to the 
requirements of any domain at any level of abstraction or details namely: (i) Industry / 
Sector; (ii) Corporate / Organization; (iii) Division / Team; (iv) Project / Product; (v) 
Mission. The scalable architecture for application of the proposed surety framework at 
society/corporate) and system/product levels would entail: 
(a) Identification of key influencing factors for each of the seven principles and generation 
of a hierarchical model for such factors depicting their roles and relationships [2]; 
(b) Assessment and quantification of these models and generation of an overall numerical 
index for each principle in the framework [3]; 
(c) Generation of a combined figure of merit (System Integrity and Resilience Index-SIRI) 
for the system, based on the seven indices derived for each principle. 
Such indices can be benchmarked against desirable or tolerable levels of safety, security 
and environmental performance thus providing a reference for the optimal assurance under 
each principle as well as the whole framework applied to a system. This generates a 
focused and responsive system for attainment, management and continual enhancement of 
safety and security properties at the pertinent application level. 
5 Conclusions 
Amongst the seven key facets of a system’s performance cited earlier, the safety, security 
and the environmental/global aspects are increasingly regulated by governments [17, 19]. 
This is partly driven by the gradual enhancement in the quality of life and public’s 
awareness and demand for a more socially responsible stance by duty holders; private and 
public corporations, service providers and the suppliers. One of the striking observations in 
the fields of safety, security and environmental assurance is the overt reliance on often 
parochial technical solutions at the expense of a systemic and holistic understanding of the 
key issues and domain requirements.  
Cybernetic systems driven by complexity, novelty and increasing pace of change and 
progression pose a challenge in safety and security if not environmental assurance due to 
inherent uncertainties. In such settings, the adoption of a systemic framework of universal 
principles assists with enhanced confidence in emergent properties where otherwise 
significant uncertainties prevail.  
The proper development of the field requires a suitable abstract systems framework that 
can explain and provide model based tools and diagnostics for emergent system properties. 
This is crucial for the development of metrics that can characterize primitive and composite 
emergent properties. Metrics may provide characterization of such properties. Linking 
emergent properties to system structure is critical, if we are to address issues of re-
engineering of systems and processes aiming for development of systems with improved 
desirable properties, or reduced risks. Engineering/reengineering for improved systems 
assurance is an area where future research has to develop. Such efforts, however, require an 
appropriate systems framework [15], [16] that can support analysis and design by following 
paths similar to those deployed for hard systems.   
We have developed and proposed an integrated framework comprising assessment and 
management paradigms collectively labeled as Surety. However, whilst the current focus 
has been the avoidance or minimization of risks, Surety framework additionally 
encompasses performance enhancement and optimization not addressed here. Such 
systemic assurance frameworks are instrumental in holistic identification, classification and 
treatment of critical issues (hazards and vulnerabilities) and the specification/adoption of 
pertinent solutions. Founded in systems theory and embodying a significant structural, 
empirical and scientific knowledge, they also assist with the evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the risk control options whilst exposing gaps in the overall landscape and strategy. In 
view of the synergies between safety and security facets of performance, adoption of one 
integrated framework would result in savings on time and effort whilst optimising 
investment in equipment and systems. They are the most potent weapon in the face of 
epistemic uncertainty. 
Beyond this intermediate development, we find the landscape of systems covered by 
many disparate specialisations, parochial expertise and lack of holism in approaching 
emergence, risk and opportunity in any complex setting. To this end, we will explore the 
concept of sustainability as a potent unifying umbrella for all emergent properties in a 
product, process, system or undertaking. Failing to find such systems based unification will 
result in more chaos and confusion about emergence and coherent engineering of emergent 
properties since each facet requires extensive expertise and competence to assure. Further 
research will be needed to develop a rational and holistic case and framework for this 
unification. Systems paradigm will provide the engine for this profound understanding. 
6 Nomenclature 
Assurance: Increasing confidence and certainty 
Gain: Lives saved, improvements made, damages prevented or avoided in the natural 
habitat or benefits accrued to a business /society or a combination thereof. The expected 
value of a future benefit. 
Hazard: Object, state or condition which in the absence of adequate detection or 
containment could lead to an accident. 
Health: Soundness of body and mind, freedom from illness 
Loss: Physical harm to people, detriment to a business/society or damage/destruction of the 
natural habitat or a combination thereof. 
Reward: A forecast for a desirable event entailing a gain. 
Risk: A forecast for an accident or loss. The expected value of a future loss.  
System: A (purposeful) composite of inter-related parts / constituents with discernible 
collective output(s) or emergent property(ies) not manifested by any of the elements. 
Safety:  Freedom of people from (physical) harm. 
Security: Freedom from vulnerability or loss caused by deliberate and malicious acts. 
Sustainability: A blend of social, economic and environmental considerations which 
render a product, system or undertaking viable and continually optimal. 
Systems Assurance: The art, science and technology of ensuring and demonstrating that a 
system is likely to achieve its objectives without engendering unacceptable levels of loss. 
Systems Safety: The art, science and technology of ensuring and demonstrating that a 
system is not likely to lead to unacceptable levels of (physical) harm to people. 
Systems Security: The art, science and technology of ensuring and demonstrating that a 
system is not likely to be vulnerable to malicious deliberate acts aimed at engendering 
unacceptable levels of loss.  
Vulnerability: Susceptibility to injury, fatality or loss. 
Welfare: Well being and quality of life for individuals and the society. 
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Fig. 1. Basic System Shell of Manufacturing Integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Systems Risk Assessment approach in the Framework 
 
 Figure 3  Systems Risk Management approach in the Surety framework 
 
 
 
